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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a new theoretical explanation for why a firm conducts 
open-market stock repurchases, tests the main predictions associated with this 
explanation and finds empirical evidence in support. Investors may disagree with 
the manager about the firm’s investment projects. A repurchase causes a change in 
the investor base as investors who are less prone to agree with the manager tender 
their shares. The model thus has the following predictions. First, a firm is more 
likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement is 
lower. Second, the post-repurchase agreement improves. Our empirical tests 
provide strong support for these predictions. The results are robust to controls for 
information asymmetry, diversity of opinion among investors, and other factors 
that may drive a firm’s share repurchase decision. Overall, the evidence is 
consistent with a repurchase being a strategic payout mode intended to improve 
alignment between management and shareholders.  
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1. Introduction 
      The past two decades have seen dramatic changes in corporate payout policy. Stock 
repurchases have increased in popularity while the proportion of dividend-paying firms has 
declined substantially (Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), and Skinner 
(2008)). Chetty and Saez (2006) find share repurchases have surged even after the dividend 
tax reform in 2003 which reduced the tax disadvantage of dividends for investors.1 In the 
ideal world of Modigliani and Miller (1958), a firm’s payout mix should not matter for the 
firm value. Why would a firm prefer to pay out cash through a share repurchase instead of a 
dividend?   
      The existing literature has offered various explanations for why firms repurchase stock 
(see Allen and Michaely (2003) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) for a summary). 
Perhaps the most popular is the information asymmetry/signaling hypothesis (see, for example, 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Dann (1981), Ofer and Thakor (1987), and Vermaelen 
(1981)). Under this hypothesis, a firm buys back shares when its management has private 
information that its stock is undervalued, so the repurchase decision signals this private 
information. Empirical studies have provided strong support for the signaling hypothesis in the 
context of self-tender offer repurchases.2  
      However, in the context of open-market repurchases, the signaling story has a few 
holes.3 First, with open-market repurchases, all that the market knows is the aggregate amount 
of repurchases approved by the Board of Directors, not the exact timing of the repurchase or 
how much the firm is repurchasing when it is actually repurchasing its stock.4 This makes it 
                                                        
1
 The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act signed into law in May 2003 cut the dividend tax 
rate over 20 percentage points, from 38.6% to 15%. As Chetty and Saez (2005, 2006) document, the 
dividend tax cut has induced an increase in dividend payments and dividend initiation. Yet it appears 
that the literature has not yet reached a consensus on whether the initiation and increase in dividends 
substitute for repurchases following the dividend tax cut in 2003. See Chetty and Saez (2006), and 
Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007). 
2
 For examples, see Asquith and Mullins (1986), Comment and Jarrell (1991), D’Mello and Shroff 
(2000) and Louis and White (2007).  
3
 Comment and Jarrell (1991) state that “the bulk of buyback activity is conducted through 
open-market repurchase programs and dutch-auction self-tender offers, methods which have less 
signaling effectiveness than the conventional fixed-price offer. This suggests that most stock buyback 
activity may be principally motivated by objectives other than (or in addition to) signaling stock 
undervaluation.” 
4
 A similar argument in the literature about the problem with considering open market repurchase 
programs as costly signals is that the programs are not firm commitments and firms vary substantially 
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hard to see theoretically how the repurchase could act as a signal when investors are not aware 
of the repurchase when it occurs.5 Empirically too the signaling argument for open-market 
repurchases encounters difficulties. For example, in contrast to the implication of the signaling 
hypothesis that repurchasing managers possess favorable private information about their firms, 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find no evidence of operational improvement in firms that 
announced share repurchase programs.6 Moreover, the survey evidence in Brav, Graham, 
Harvey and Michaely (2005) suggests that managers do not use open-market repurchases 
specifically as a signaling tool.     
      A second hole in the signaling story is that it suggests that firms would tend to 
repurchase stock during periods of low market valuation because that is when undervaluation 
is the most likely. Yet, we witnessed large amounts of open-market repurchases during the bull 
market of 2002-2007. Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) explicitly show that aggregate repurchases 
increase in stock market valuation. 
      As an alternative to signaling, we offer a new explanation for open-market repurchases. 
It is based on the idea that management can use a repurchase to realign the firm’s investor base. 
Specifically, we argue that different generations of investors may have heterogeneous prior 
beliefs about the probability of the firm’s future investment opportunities, and thus there may 
be a divergence of opinions over whether the firm’s cash flow should be paid out to 
shareholders or be invested. For example, some investors may endorse the view that the firm 
should diversify into a new line of business through acquisitions, while others may view 
diversification as a bad idea. Management would like to invest in all projects it believes to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
in the completion rates of these programs. See, for example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Rau 
and Vermaelen (2002).   
5 Oded (2005) presents an asymmetric-information based signaling model to explain the positive 
announcement returns of open-market repurchase programs. Yet the literature has also documented 
several sources of announcement returns that are unrelated to signaling. See Babenko (2009), Dittmar 
(2000), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Maxwell and Stephens (2003) among others. Further, 
Babenko, Tserlukevich and Vedrashko (2009) suggest that while managers may buy stock prior to a 
repurchase program announcement, it is likely to be motivated by maximizing personal profits rather 
than an intention to convey information. For an asymmetric-information justification for open-market 
repurchases that does not involve signaling, see Brennan and Thakor (1990). 
6
 Lie (2005) shows that firms with actual repurchases after open-market repurchase program 
announcements experience relative improvements in operating performance relative to their control 
firms. However, Gong, Louis and Sun (2008) suggest that the reported improvement in operating 
performance is very likely to be driven by pre-repurchase downward earnings management rather than 
a genuine growth in profitability.   
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have positive NPV, but it also cares about whether investors will endorse its decisions since 
this will affect the firm’s stock price, something management is concerned with. An 
open-market repurchase is a mechanism for the firm to buy out investors who are more likely 
to disagree with management, thereby increasing the likelihood of investor endorsement of 
managerial decisions by concentrating ownership in the hands of investors more likely to 
agree with management.  
      Even when a firm buys back shares at the market price and thus no premium is offered 
as typically observed in a tender offer or even a Dutch auction repurchase, we argue the 
repurchase can serve the purpose of getting rid of disagreeing investors. This is because the 
marginal shareholders at any stock price who are indifferent between selling and holding their 
stock are willing to sell if there is a buy order at the market price. The open market repurchase 
creates the buy orders.7 Furthermore, either due to wealth constraints or risk aversion, 
investors who are better aligned with management might not absorb all shares sold by those 
disagreeing investors, which makes the firm’s buyback necessary to change the investor base.     
      We develop a simple theoretical model that is based on this idea. It produces two 
predictions. First, the likelihood of a firm undertaking a repurchase is higher when its 
agreement parameter is lower. Second, the investor-management agreement improves 
subsequent to the repurchase. In pursuing the empirical test of the first hypothesis, we employ 
an identification strategy that relies on firm fixed-effect estimations to circumvent a potential 
endogeneity problem that our agreement proxies and the decision to repurchase may have both 
been driven by some unobserved intrafirm variation (see Khwaja and Mian (2008)). Using 
different measures of the agreement between investors and management, we find strong 
empirical support for it. In testing the second hypothesis, we extract a straightforward 
implication of the model and then test it. Specifically, the model suggests that firms that 
repurchase their shares to increase investor-management agreement will experience larger 
abnormal price reactions to acquisition announcements than otherwise-comparable firms that 
do not engage in pre-acquisition repurchases. This is because higher agreement implies a 
greater propensity on the part of investors to endorse management decisions. Our empirical 
                                                        
7
 Using firms’ supplementally disclosed repurchase trading data, Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004) 
document that open market repurchases increase market liquidity of repurchasing firms’ stock. 
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tests validate this prediction.  
      Our theory predicts low investor-management agreement prior to the repurchase, 
which necessarily means low stock price. Thus, our prediction of the link between a firm’s 
repurchase decision and its stock price is consistent with that of the information 
asymmetry/signaling hypothesis. The difference is that in the signaling hypothesis, the 
pre-repurchase undervaluation is due to investors’ lack of information that the manager 
possesses, while in our theory, it is because of the investors’ different interpretation of the 
publicly available information. Furthermore, disagreement (and thus undervaluation) can arise 
even in the absence of information asymmetry.  
      To clearly delineate our agreement explanation from the signaling hypothesis, we 
perform several checks in addition to controlling for stock price. First, we rely on firm 
fixed-effect estimation to exploit within-firm variation. It helps to alleviate the information 
asymmetry concern as this problem should be more pronounced in a cross-firm comparison. 
Second, to address the concern that our agreement proxies may be related with information 
asymmetry, we include several measures of information asymmetry that do not share any 
apparent link with investor-management agreement. The results on those measures are mixed. 
And yet the statistical and economic magnitudes of the estimates on our main agreement 
proxies are largely unaffected. Finally, one of our main agreement proxies, the number of 
months that a firm beats its EPS forecast in a year, is subject to an alternative interpretation: 
the earnings surprise suggests information asymmetry. The higher the number is, the more 
severe is the information asymmetry. Therefore, it generates a prediction that the likelihood of 
a repurchase is positively related to this proxy, while our theory suggests the opposite. The 
results support our prediction. In sum, although our study does not rule out information 
asymmetry as a possible motivation, the results we find suggest that agreement has an 
incremental explanatory power in a firm’s repurchase decision. 
      The notion of agreement between investors and management is related to diversity of 
opinion among investors (e.g., Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2006) and Miller (1977)). They also differ to some extent. Intuitively, investors can disagree 
among themselves but agree with the management as a whole. In contrast, investors can 
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disagree with the management but share considerable agreement among themselves.8 While it 
is not indispensable to draw a distinct line between agreement and diversity of opinion, we 
conduct several more tests to distinguish our agreement theory from diversity of opinion 
interpretation. First, one of our main agreement proxies mentioned above, the number of 
months that a firm beats its EPS forecast in a year, is clearly divorced from disagreement 
among investors. The results based on this proxy support our theory. Second, we follow Chen, 
Hong and Stein (2002) and create a diversity of opinion proxy – breadth of ownership – that is 
not related to investor-management agreement. Inclusion of this variable does not alter our 
results, while we find the diversity of opinion interpretation is also supported. Third, some 
studies (e.g., Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)) interpret high analysts’ EPS forecast 
dispersion as diversity of opinion among investors, while we use it as a proxy for 
disagreement between investors and management. The prediction of the diversity of opinion 
interpretation, in contrast with ours, is that a firm is less likely to make a repurchase with 
higher dispersion, because diversity of opinion combined with short sale constraints can lead 
to stock overvaluation. The results are consistent with our agreement interpretation.     
      Besides providing empirical evidence to support the investor-management agreement 
model of open-market repurchases, we also provide additional evidence that casts doubt on the 
signaling motivation. We do this by noting that if an open-market repurchase announcement 
was a signal, then information asymmetry should diminish after the repurchase announcement, 
so the abnormal stock price reaction to subsequent signals should be smaller. And if earnings 
surprise is an indicator of information asymmetry, there should be positive surprise for 
earnings announcements made prior to the repurchase announcement and the surprise should 
be subdued following the repurchase announcement. We find, however, that the abnormal 
announcement returns accompanying earnings announcements for the quarter (or the two 
quarters) subsequent to a repurchase announcement are significantly greater than those for the 
quarter (or the two quarters) prior to the announcement. And we show that this finding cannot 
be explained solely on the basis of pre-repurchase downward earnings management in firms 
                                                        
8
 “Agreement”, “investor-management agreement” and “agreement between investors and 
management” are used interchangeably throughout the paper, and so are “diversity of opinion” and 
“diversity of opinion among investors”.  
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with actual repurchases in the year of the repurchase announcement (Gong, Louis and Sun 
(2008)). It is rather, at least partially, consistent with an expected improvement in agreement 
following the repurchase announcement which fuels higher firm valuation. In addition, we do 
not find evidence of earnings surprise that is consistent with the signaling hypothesis either.  
      Our paper is related to the shareholder heterogeneity argument by Bagwell (1991b, 
1992) that firms face upward-sloping supply curves for their shares. Bagwell (1991a) provides 
a theoretical argument that a stock repurchase can be used as a takeover deterrent. As 
shareholders with the lowest valuations tender their shares, the repurchase skews the 
distribution of remaining shareholders and makes the takeover more expensive. Stulz (1988) 
shows that management could repurchase shares to increase the fraction of the votes it controls, 
and the strengthened control contributes to firm value by increasing the premium offered if a 
hostile takeover attempt is made to the firm. In our paper, the heterogeneity among 
shareholders is that investors have different propensities to agree with management, and we 
extend Bagwell’s insight to show that investor-management agreement provides an impetus 
for repurchases. And higher firm valuation is associated with improvement in 
investor-management agreement.  
      Our paper contributes to the literature that examines a firm’s preference for repurchase 
in the payout mix. Studies like Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000) argue that firms prefer the flexibility of using repurchases rather than 
dividends to adjust payouts in response to transitory cash flow shocks, because dividends 
represent a more rigid payout commitment. Another strand of research relates the surge in 
repurchases to the growing use of stock options to compensate managements and employees 
(e.g., Babenko (2009), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002) and Weisbenner (2004)). We 
control for these well-documented factors and find that our agreement factor remains 
significant in a firm’s repurchase decision. 
      Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the corporate finance and 
contracting implications of disagreement based on differences in beliefs. See, for example, 
Abel and Mailath (1994), Allen and Gale (1999), Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2006, 2008), 
Coval and Thakor (2005), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Van 
den Steen (2004, forthcoming).   
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      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and the variables used in the empirical tests. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology, tests of the main hypotheses and the main 
results. Section 5 provides evidence that open-market repurchase announcements do not 
diminish information asymmetry. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Hypotheses Development and Empirical Predictions 
      Imagine a firm whose manager makes decisions that affect the firm’s value. The 
manager always seeks to make decisions that maximize the value of the firm, but investors 
may disagree that a particular decision is value-maximizing. If investors agree with the 
manager, they value the firm at VG, and if they disagree they value it at VB < VG. The 
probability that an investor group i will agree with the manager is ρi. Thus, investors group i 
assigns a value Vi to the firm, where  
Vi = ρi VG + (1 – ρi ) VB 
     Either due to wealth endowment constraints or risk aversion or both, each investor 
group i holds a limited fraction of the firm’s shares. Thus, in equilibrium the firm will be held 
by investors with different agreement parameters, ρi. The lowest agreement parameter will be 
that of the marginal group of investors, with inframarginal investors having higher values of ρi.  
It is clear that Vi is strictly increasing in ρi. 
      For simplicity, assume that the amount of wealth invested in the firm by any investor 
group is the same across all investor groups that are long in the stock9, and that the distribution 
of the mass of investors is uniform across ρ  [ρ0, ρmax], where ρ0 is the ρ of the marginal 
investor in the stock and ρmax is the ρ of the investor with the highest ρ in the stock. The firm’s 
stock price will then be: 
V0 = ρ0 VG + (1– ρ0) VB 
      Let B() be the benefit to the firm that the manager perceives from increasing the 
agreement of the marginal investor. That is, if the firm repurchases stock at the prevailing 
                                                        
9
 This assumption is reasonable if investors are risk neutral and wealth constrained with equal wealth 
endowments. More generally, we would expect investors with higher ρ’s to invest more. However, the 
results are even stronger with that specification.  
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market price V0 or a slightly higher price, the first shareholders to sell will be the marginal 
investors with ρ = ρ0, and then as the firm repurchases increasing amounts, it will have to pay 
higher prices in order to induce investors with higher value of ρ to sell. A repurchase will lead 
to the post-repurchase ρ of the new marginal investors, call it ρ*, being higher than ρ0, the 
pre-repurchase ρ of the marginal investors.  
      Thus, the increase in ρ due to a repurchase in which $C is spent on the repurchase is  
ρ (C, ρ0) = ρ
*(C) – ρ0  
We assume that B() is an increasing and concave function of ρ and that ρ*(C) is increasing 
in C. Viewing C as an investment in the repurchase, the firm chooses C to maximize its net 
benefit from the repurchase as: 
π = B(ρ (C)) – C 
      The first-order condition is:  
 = 	() 
– 1 = 0 
Since there is an equal mass of investors at every ρ and the distribution of ρ’s is uniform, it 
follows that, for any fixed C, the 
 that is achieved will be smaller as ρ0 increases. This is 
because it costs the firm more money to buy the marginal investors out in a repurchase as the 
stock price increases, and the stock price is increasing in ρ0. That is, 
  will be 
decreasing in ρ0. Moreover, 

  0. Given this, and the assumptions on B(), it 
follows that the second-order condition for a unique maximum is satisfied.  
      Some predictions are apparent from this. Controlling for the amount of money spent in 
the repurchase, the higher the pre-repurchase agreement parameter, the smaller will be 
post-repurchase improvement in agreement. Thus, a firm is more likely to undertake an 
open-market repurchase when the agreement parameter is lower. And the agreement improves 
following the repurchase. That is, we have the following testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The lower the investor-management agreement parameter, the more likely 
is the firm to undertake a repurchase. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The post-repurchase investor-management agreement improves.    
 
3. Data Description and Definition of Variables 
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3.1. Data and Sample Construction 
      We construct our initial sample by starting with all US firms in COMPUSTAT from 
1987 to 2006 that list their common stocks in NYSE, Nasdaq or AMEX. We omit all utility 
and financial firms whose primary SIC classification is between 4900 and 4999 and between 
6000 and 6999, respectively. As discussed later, we rely on firm fixed-effect estimation in 
testing Hypothesis 1. Thus, for a firm to be included in our sample, we require that its main 
annual accounting and returns data are available for at least three consecutive years in the 
sample period. We obtain firm-level accounting data from COMPUSTAT, returns data from 
CRSP, institutional shareholding data and mutual funds holding data from CDA/Spectrum, 
analysts’ EPS forecast data from I/B/E/S in Thomson Financial, managerial ownership and 
unexercised options data from ExecuComp, and open-market repurchase announcement data 
from Securities Data Corporation (SDC). After matching the institutional shareholding data 
with the initial sample, our final sample consists of 55035 firm-years for 6291 firms.10  
 
3.2. Definition of Variables   
      We first discuss our measure of share repurchase. Then we focus on the main measures 
to proxy for agreement. In order to distinguish our agreement (between investors and 
management) theory from other hypotheses, such as information asymmetry/signaling 
hypothesis and diversity of opinion among investors, we also discuss measures we employ for 
information asymmetry and diversity of opinion, as well as other control variables.  
    
Share Repurchase 
      Following the approach taken in Fama and French (2001) and Skinner (2008), we 
measure share repurchases as net repurchases, netting out any associated stock reissuance used 
in employee stock ownership and executive stock option plans, and in payment to the acquired 
firm in a merger and in other corporate activities.11 Specifically, as in Skinner (2008), we 
                                                        
10
 When we match the analysts’ EPS forecast data with the initial sample in using the analysts’ EPS 
forecast as proxies for agreement, more firms are dropped from the sample due to the lack of data in 
I/B/E/S. 
11
 By using net repurchases instead of raw repurchases, we focus on repurchases that are less likely to 
be motivated by undoing the dilution of EPS from stock options (e.g. Kahle (2002) and Weisbenner 
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measure repurchases for year t as the change in common treasury stock (Compustat item 226) 
from year t-1 to year t, if the firm uses the treasury stock method for repurchases. If the firm 
uses the “retirement” method which is inferred from the fact that treasure stock is zero in the 
current and prior year, we take repurchases for year t as the difference between purchases 
(Compustat item 115) and sales (Compustat item 108) of common and preferred stock in year 
t. If either of these amounts is negative, repurchases are set to zero.12 
 
Investor-management Agreement 
      We use four proxies for investor-management agreement: institutional shareholding, 
analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion, the number of months a firm’s actual EPS beats the analysts’ 
forecast in a fiscal year, and the dual-class control premium. We discuss each below. 
 
(i) Institutional shareholding as a percentage of a firm’s total shares 
outstanding at the fiscal year-end: 
      Relative to individual investors, institutional investors arguably have better access to 
information about the firm and bear lower costs in information production. Thus, the 
differences in beliefs between institutional investors and management are less likely to be due 
to limited information access for investors, and more likely to be due to different 
interpretations of the same information (as in Kandel and Pearson (1995)). The idea in using 
institutional shareholding as a proxy for agreement is that when institutional investors disagree 
with managers, they are likely to “vote with their feet” by selling their shares in the firms. It is 
consistent with the finding of a survey of institutional investors by McCahery, Sautner, and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(2004)), or by funding firms’ acquisitions or pension plans.   
12 
An accurate measurement of open-market repurchases is empirically difficult. Banyi, Dyl and Kahle 
(2008) find higher error rates in commonly used estimators of share repurchases. Our measure here is 
an approximation of open-market repurchases, as it may also include repurchases of securities other 
than common stock and other forms of common stock repurchases such as self-tender offers. However, 
transactions other than open-market repurchases only represent a small fraction of firms’ repurchase 
activity (Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000), and Grullon and 
Michaely (2002)). Further, to reduce the potential impact of those transactions on our results, we drop 
observations with net repurchases that are in the top 5% by size (which is equivalent to 12.84% of 
market value of equity or more in our sample) as such observations typically involve tender offers and 
transactions other than open-market repurchases (Fenn and Liang (2001) and Comment and Jarrell 
(1991)); we find that our results are not affected. 
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Starks (2010).13 Also, Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership 
declines in the year prior to forced CEO turnover.14 Thus, ceteris paribus, we can interpret a 
significant intertemporal drop in institutional ownership as an expression by institutional 
investors that they disagree with management at that point in time.  
      Admittedly, another potential channel through which institutional investors exert 
influence on management is monitoring and pressing management to make the desired 
changes to eliminate disagreement.15 The incentives to do this will depend, of course, on the 
size of the ownership stake and whether the institution plans to maintain its investment for a 
sufficiently long time. Investors with larger ownership stakes and those planning to be 
long-term investors are more likely to exert pressure on management through private 
discussions or by sponsoring a proxy proposal for shareholder voting if private negotiations 
fail (e.g. Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998)). This view is consistent with Chen, Harford 
and Li (2007) who find that only independent long-term institutions actively monitor firms’ 
acquisition decisions and benefit from this monitoring.16 
      The existing empirical studies on the effect of institutional shareholder activism have 
generated mixed results17. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find evidence that an increase in 
overall institutional ownership or higher shareholdings by the five largest institutions is not 
followed by an increase in payouts either through repurchases or dividends, contradicting the 
notion that institutional investors attempt to reduce agency conflicts by prompting 
management to pay out cash. As we show later, a firm is less likely to buy back shares 
following an increase in overall institutional shareholding. Thus, the Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005) finding is more consistent with our story than with the agency hypothesis.   
      To reflect the potential differences between institutions in their responses to perceived 
disagreement with management, we categorize institutions into groups based on their holdings 
                                                        
13
 Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009) examine theoretically how the exit of large 
shareholders alleviates the agency problem between managers and shareholders.  
14
 Gopalan (2006) explicitly shows that institutional investors’ share selling can take a disciplinary role 
in a firm’s acquisition decision. 
15
 For studies examining institutional investors’ decision between intervention and trading, see Huddart 
(1993), Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994), and Kahn and Winton (1998). 
16
 Recently, Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) document the success 
of activist hedge funds in monitoring.  
17
 See Chen, Harford and Li (2007) for a summary of the literature on the shareholder wealth effect of 
activism. 
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and their potential business ties with the firms they invest in. Following the literature, we 
consider shareholdings by the largest institutional investor (Top1 holdings), by institutions 
with at least 5% of the outstanding shares (Blockholdings) and by the second largest to the 
fifth largest institutions (Top2-5 holdings). In analyzing the net benefit and thus the incentive 
to monitor based on the investors’ ownership stakes, we would expect that institutions with 
relatively small ownership positions in a firm (neither the Top1 investor nor blockholders) are 
those more likely to “vote with their feet” when they disagree with management, while 
institutions with the largest ownership stakes are those most likely to stay invested and 
pressure management for changes.  
      Based on an institution’s potential business ties with the firms they invest in, following 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) and others in the literature, we also classify banks and 
insurance companies (type 1 and 2 institutions in CDA/Spectrum institutional classification) 
as “grey institutions”, and investment companies and independent investment advisors (type 3 
and 4 institutions in CDA/Spectrum) as “independent institutions”. The existing or potential 
business ties with the firms they invest in may make the grey institutions less willing to 
challenge management decisions, and they are less likely to sell their holdings even when they 
disagree with management. Instead, without business relationships, independent institutions 
are more likely to sell their holdings when they disagree with management if activism is costly. 
Thus, a significant drop in the shareholdings of independent institutions is a stronger sign of 
lowered investor-management agreement than is a similar change in the shareholdings of grey 
institutions. 
      In our subsequent discussion of the empirical methodology in Section 4, we mention 
that we use firm fixed-effect estimation to exploit the within-firm variation of institutional 
ownership over time to detect disagreement. This is motivated by the fact that the level of 
institutional holdings varies significantly across firms. This cross-sectional variation may be 
driven by a variety of factors related to the manner in which institutional investors allocate 
their funds across securities. Their level of agreement is likely to be just one of these factors. 
However, institutional investors are typically not high-frequency traders, so when they sell 
their holdings in a firm, it is likely to be because they have observed a management decision 
that they do not endorse. Thus, a drop in institutional ownership to below its average level 
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within a firm (after properly accounting for the time trend of overall institutional ownership) is 
an indication of a decrease in agreement, and our interest is in examining whether it is during 
these times of relatively low agreement that repurchases occur. 
      We also include the number of institutional investors for a given firm as a control 
variable for the following reason. There may be a reduction in agreement for existing 
institutional investors who then reduce their holdings, but this may happen at a time when 
some new institutional investors (with relatively low agreement parameters) add the firm to 
their portfolios, thereby offsetting the lower holdings of the existing investors. The overall 
level of agreement declines, even though the overall institutional ownership is unchanged. 
Controlling for the number of institutional investors enables us to deal with this. With that 
control, a decrease in institutional ownership, holding fixed the number of institutional 
investors, will make a repurchase more likely, so the change in institutional ownership is 
predicted to have a negative sign. By contrast, holding fixed the change in institutional 
ownership, an increase in the number of institutional investors means a decrease in overall 
agreement, which makes a repurchase more likely. So the number of institutional investors is 
predicted to have a positive sign.  
 
(ii) Analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion: 
      Following Dittmar and Thakor (2007), we define this proxy as the standard deviation 
of analysts’ EPS forecasts in the fiscal year-end prior to the actual repurchase divided by book 
equity. Assuming that all analysts have equal access to information, any divergence of 
opinions among analysts must reflect disagreement among them. And to the extent that 
disagreement among analysts is highly correlated with disagreement between investors and 
management, we interpret higher analysts’ forecast dispersion as implying lower 
investor-management agreement.18  
 
(iii) The number of months that a firm’s actual EPS beats the analyst forecast in 
                                                        
18
 Analysts (and investors) can share significant agreement with management while disagreeing with 
each other, and thus it might be a crude proxy for investor-management agreement. We will return to 
this issue later. 
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a fiscal year: 
      We use I/B/E/S to collect analysts’ monthly forecasts of a firm’s year-end EPS. Using 
the mean analysts’ forecast as the measure of analyst consensus in a month, we see if a firm’s 
actual EPS outperforms the analyst consensus for every month of a year. The idea, discussed 
in Dittmar and Thakor (2007), is that delivering better-than-expected earnings can enhance 
management credibility with investors and can make it less likely that investors will challenge 
management decisions. Thus, we expect that investors’ propensity to agree with the manager 
increases with the persistence of superior performance over time. This variable takes values 
between zero and twelve (the number of months in a year), with higher values implying higher 
agreement.  
      There are cases of missing analyst forecasts for some months in a year for some firms. 
This will bias downward the value of this agreement variable. To tackle this issue and verify 
robustness, we also use the proportion of months (with available analyst forecasts) that the 
firm beats the forecast.  
 
(iv) Dual-class control premium: 
      We follow Dittmar and Thakor (2007) and use the control premium for dual-class stock 
as an alternative proxy for agreement. Due to the limited data availability on this proxy, we 
focus on the three main proxies discussed above in presenting the results and use this proxy as 
a robustness check. 
      Firms with dual-class ownership structures typically have two share classes that have 
equal cash flow rights but divergent voting rights. The insider-held voting stock has more 
voting or control rights and thus trades at a premium relative to the widely-held non-voting 
stock. The difference in the prices at which voting and non-voting shares trade represents the 
value of voting. Of course, the right to vote has value only if there is a non-zero probability 
that one may vote against management. A shareholder who is certain to endorse every 
managerial decision has no reason to pay extra for the right to vote. Instead, the more likely a 
shareholder is to disagree with the manager, the higher will be the value the shareholder will 
attach to the right to vote. Thus, we predict that a dual-class firm is more likely to conduct 
open-market repurchases when the control premium is higher (designating lower 
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manager-shareholder agreement). 
      To measure the control premium, we need to have the prices of the two classes of stock 
and hence we focus on firms with dual-class stock when both classes trade. After imposing the 
sampling restrictions as discussed in Section 3.1, we find 96 firms with dual-class stock 
trading in 893 firm-years. Using the CRSP monthly pricing data, we measure the control 
premium as the superior stock price minus the inferior stock price divided by the inferior stock 
price for a given month. Then we have an aggregate annual control premium by taking the 
median of the monthly premium for each firm-year. To verify robustness, we also use the 
mean (or the sum) of the monthly premium; we find that the results are largely unaffected. 
  
Information Asymmetry 
      The information asymmetry/signaling hypothesis predicts low stock returns prior to a 
repurchase, thus we control for the firm’s pre-repurchase stock returns, as well as the market 
returns (defined as the value-weighted market return from CRSP) to deal with the possibility 
that information asymmetry may also be related to the market condition. Yet our agreement 
hypothesis also predicts pre-repurchase low stock returns due to low investor-management 
agreement. Controlling for stock returns alone, thus, is not sufficient to draw a distinction 
between these two hypotheses. Furthermore, one may argue that some of our agreement 
proxies may be related to information asymmetry.  
      As discussed later, we rely on firm fixed-effect estimation to explore within-firm 
variation in examining a firm’s repurchase decision. Therefore, the effect of any unobserved 
time-invariant firm characteristics that are related to information asymmetry will be eliminated. 
Additionally, large firms are more likely to be included in our sample as we use institutional 
ownership and analyst forecast data. The advantage of the estimation method and our 
sampling of relatively large firms both work to help alleviate the information asymmetry 
problem to some extent, which is more of a severe concern in cross-sectional studies and in 
small firms.  
      Nevertheless, to further disentangle the effect of agreement from that of asymmetric 
information, we include several measures of information asymmetry that are not related to 
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agreement.19 One proxy is the firm-specific stock return variation, Psi, developed in Durney, 
Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003). 20  Based on Roll’s (1988) observation that low 
statistics for common asset pricing models is due to firm-specific return variation that is 
not associated with public information, they show that firms and industries with lower 
market-model statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future 
earnings. The idea is that greater firm-specific variation in stock prices implies that more 
information about future earnings is incorporated into the stock price and hence there is less 
information asymmetry. Specifically, the firm-specific stock return variation of a given 
firm-year is defined as Psi = 


, where is obtained from regressing a firm’s weekly 
stock returns on market return and industry return (defined at the two-digit SIC level) for the 
given year. Intuitively, the higher the level of Psi, the lower is the information asymmetry 
between the investors and managers of a firm. 
      Following the literature (e.g. Dierkens (1991) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2007)), we also include two other proxies for information asymmetry: the firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatility and the standard deviation of the earnings announcement abnormal return. The 
former measure, labeled as Volatility, is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market 
model regression of the daily stock returns for all trading days in a year. The latter, labeled as 
Earnings residual (std), is measured as the standard deviation of all three-day (–1,+1) 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around earnings announcements over the past five years. 
The earnings announcement dates are obtained from I/B/E/S and a minimum of four 
announcements is required to compute the CAR standard deviation. We estimate the CAR 
using the CRSP equally weighted index and the market model where the parameters for the 
market model are estimated over the (–205, –6) day interval.  
      It is worthwhile to note that one plausible argument against our use of the number of 
months that a firm beats its EPS forecast as an agreement proxy is that the earnings surprise 
can be interpreted as an indicator of asymmetric information. And the higher value this 
                                                        
19
 The firm fixed-effect estimation requires proxies for information asymmetry whose values vary 
intertemporally for a given firm. Many commonly-used proxies for information asymmetry in 
cross-sectional studies, however, do not satisfy this intertemporal property. 
20
 This proxy has been increasingly used in the literature. See, for example, Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000), Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) and Dittmar and Thakor (2007).  
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variable has, the greater can be the magnitude of information asymmetry. Using this variable, 
thus, also allows us to distinguish between agreement and information asymmetry hypothesis.  
        
Diversity of Opinion among Investors 
      The notion of agreement is related to diversity of opinion among investors (e.g., Miller 
(1977) and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006)). They also differ to some extent. Intuitively, 
investors can disagree among themselves but agree with the management as a whole. Chen, 
Hong and Stein (2002), Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), and Diether (2004) among 
others suggest that diversity of opinion among investors combined with short-sale constraints 
that keep out pessimistic investors can lead to higher price and lower subsequent returns. Thus, 
it follows that a firm is less likely to repurchase its overvalued shares. In contrast, investors 
can disagree with the management but share considerable agreement among themselves. This 
makes the analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion a crude proxy for investor-management agreement 
if we do not control explicitly for diversity of opinion among investors themselves.  
      To delineate the effect of agreement from that of diversity of opinion, we include a 
proxy for diversity of opinion following Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) – change in breadth of 
ownership – that has little to do with agreement.21 It, labeled as Breadth of ownership, is 
defined as the number of mutual funds who hold a long position in the stock in the year end 
prior to the repurchase (year –1) minus the number holding the stock in the previous year end 
(year –2), and divide by the total number of available mutual funds reporting in both year 
ends.    
      Some studies (e.g., Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)) interpret analysts’ EPS 
forecast dispersion as a proxy for diversity of opinion.22 The link of stock overvaluation with 
high dispersion thus suggests that a firm is less likely to conduct an open market repurchase in 
time of high dispersion, a prediction opposite to ours as we interpret dispersion as a proxy for 
agreement. Therefore, this variable is useful in making a distinction between agreement and 
diversity of opinion in explaining a firm’s repurchase decision.  
                                                        
21
 Recent literature, for instance, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2007), also uses this proxy for diversity of opinion.     
22
 Johnson (2004) challenges this interpretation. Thakor and Whited (forthcoming) also provides a test 
of this interpretation against the investor-management agreement interpretation. 
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Other Control Variables 
      We also include other control variables that have been used in the stock repurchase 
literature (e.g. Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000)). We measure firm size as the 
natural log of sales. A larger firm is more likely to pay out cash through dividends or 
repurchases. Return on assets is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Non-operating 
income is the ratio of non-operating income (Compustat item 61) to total assets. Jagannathan, 
Stephens and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) find that firms tend to pay out 
“temporary”, non-operating cash flows through repurchases, and use dividends to distribute 
“permanent”, operating cash flows. The market-to-book ratio is a measure of growth 
opportunities. Intuitively, firms with higher growth opportunities prefer to retain earnings and 
invest more. Capital expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, and debt 
ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Firms with higher capital expenditures and debt 
ratios are more likely to have exhausted earnings and thus less likely to pay out cash through 
repurchases. Managerial ownership is defined as shares owned (excluding options) by the top 
five firm executives divided by the number of total shares outstanding. Managerial options are 
the total number of unexercised options by the top five firm executives that were vested. In 
order to reduce the impact of outliers, we follow the literature and winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
      Figure 1 plots the increase in dollar value of net repurchase from 1988 through 2006, 
while Figure 2 shows the normalized value by the aggregate market capitalization of all firms 
and that of repurchasing firms in the same time period. Aggregate repurchases peaked in 1999 
beginning from the end of 1980s, and then dropped slightly afterwards. However, since 2003 
there has been an increase, with the most dramatic increase occurring through 2006. By the 
end of 2006, the total dollar value of net repurchases had almost tripled from its historical 
peak in 1999. Similar to Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), we find that the market-cap normalized 
net repurchase value moves in pace with the stock market and business cycles and also 
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indicates the intensiveness of repurchase activity in the middle and through the end of 1990s 
and after 2003. Overall, consistent with the literature (e.g. Grullon and Michaely (2002) and 
Skinner (2008)), Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that share repurchases have become an 
increasingly significant payout mode, even after the dividend tax cut in 2003. In addition, the 
sharp increase in repurchases since 2003 suggests that the initiation and increase in dividend 
payments following the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act may not have come at 
the expense of a reduction in share repurchases.  
      Figure 3 plots the proportion of firms that make open-market repurchases by year. We 
examine separately firms that make repurchases only and firms that engage in both 
repurchasing shares and paying dividends in a given year. Before 1997, the proportion of firms 
that made repurchases only does not differ from that of firms that paid out cash through both 
repurchases and dividends. Yet during 1997-2006, there is a high growth in the fraction of 
firms that repurchased shares without paying dividends, even though the growth rates vary 
over time and seem to be correlated with stock market valuations. The evidence in Figure 3 
strengthens the finding in Figures 1 and 2 that share repurchases have been an increasingly 
significant phenomenon.  
      Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 55035 firm-year observations for 6291 
firms from 1987 through 2006. As shown in Panel A, an average firm makes net repurchases 
once every five years. The annual net repurchases are valued at about 3.4% (median 1.9%) of 
the firm’s market value of equity, 7.3% (median 3.8%) of the firm’s book value of equity, and 
3.6% (median 1.8%) of the firm’s book value of total assets. Panel B of Table 1 presents 
summary statistics on the four measures of investor-management agreement. The average 
(median) institutional shareholding is about 35% (31%) of the firm’s total shares outstanding. 
Consistent with the literature (e.g. Gompers and Metrick (2001)), we find that overall 
institutional ownership increases over time. The largest institution (Top1) and the succeeding 
four largest institutions (Top2-5) in a firm own an average (median) 7.5% (6.6%) and 11.3% 
(11.5%) of the total shares outstanding. Institutions that have at least a 5% ownership stake 
(Blockholders) take an average (median) of 17.5% (14.5%) of the total share outstanding. 
Independent institutions, on average, hold more shares than grey institutions, with mean 
(median) holdings being 16% versus 7% (10% versus 4.7%). For analysts’ EPS forecast 
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dispersion divided by book equity, the average (median) is 0.76×10-3 (0.09×10-3). The mean 
(median) number of months a firm’s EPS beats the analysts’ EPS forecast in a fiscal year is 
5.74 (5). Note that after merging our sample with the I/B/E/S database, we are left with an 
unbalanced panel of 34151 firm-years for 4299 firms. For the 96 firms with traded dual-class 
stocks, the mean (median) control premium of the superior stocks is 0.05 (0.005). Panel C of 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for firm-level accounting variables and stock returns which 
are comparable with other studies. Panel D of Table 1 provides information on the three 
information asymmetry measures, the diversity of opinion proxy, as well as managerial 
ownership and options.  
  
4. Empirical Analysis and Results of Investor-Management Agreement       
      This section discusses the methodology and results of our empirical tests of the two 
hypotheses as well as alternative interpretations of our results and robustness checks. 
 
4.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1: The lower the investor-management agreement parameter, the more likely is the 
firm to undertake a repurchase. 
 
4.1.1. Empirical Methodology 
      To test this hypothesis, we could perform a cross-sectional comparison of the 
pre-repurchase agreement parameters of repurchasing firms, and relate these parameters to the 
repurchase decisions cross-sectionally. However, there is an endogeneity problem in that the 
agreement parameters and the decision to repurchase may have both been driven by some 
unobserved intrafirm variation. Specifically, firms vary significantly in their payout decisions, 
payout modes and magnitudes of cash distributions, and these differences persist over time. 
The literature has shown that large and mature firms are more likely to distribute cash through 
repurchases or dividends or both relative to small and young firms. Moreover, institutional 
investors form clienteles in terms of the types of firms they wish to invest in. For instance, 
prudence considerations lead institutional investors to prefer firms with large market 
capitalizations, sufficient liquidity and low volatility (Del Guercio (1996) and Gompers and 
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Metrick (2001)). Finally, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersions also vary across different 
types of firms, typically being lower for low-growth and mature firms than for high-growth 
firms. Thus, if the same unobservable time-invariant factors that determine investor clienteles 
and cross-sectional variations in analysts’ forecast dispersions are also those that influence 
firms’ repurchase decisions, then there is an identification problem. Ignoring this problem may 
lead us to erroneously conclude that a firm with higher institutional ownership and lower 
analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion is more likely to undertake a repurchase. 
      To tackle this identification problem and mitigate the concern about potentially omitted 
variables, we rely on firm fixed-effect regressions and exploit within-firm variations while 
controlling for any time effects, similar to Khwaja and Mian (2008).23 With this firm 
fixed-effect approach, the effect of any unobserved firm-specific factors that may have driven 
both the agreement level and the decision to repurchase is completely absorbed since we make 
the comparison across different time periods for the same firm. Specifically, the variables of 
interest like the repurchase decision and the level of manager-investor agreement, as well as 
other control variables, are time-demeaned for a given firm, and they should be interpreted as 
the deviation from the average level for the firm. For instance, we interpret a drop in 
institutional ownership of a firm in a given year to below its average level as a decrease in 
agreement. We include yearly dummies to control for the potential time trend of the variables, 
e.g. the trend of increasing overall institutional ownership over time as documented by 
Gompers and Metrick (2001). 
      Specifically, we examine how firm i’s repurchase decision in year t is affected by the 
firm’s lagged agreement parameters and other lagged control variables in year t-1, based on 
the following baseline linear probability model24:  
 
Repurchase it = α + β1 * Agreement it-1 + β2 * Controls it-1 + µi + ηt + εit 
                                                        
23
 In examining the impact of a bank’s liquidity shock on its loan supply to client firms, Khwaja and 
Mian (2008) adopt a firm fixed-effect approach to address the possible correlation of a firm’s 
productivity shock with both the change in loan size and the bank’s liquidity shock, which generates an 
identification problem. With this firm fixed-effect approach, the effect of a firm-specific productivity 
shock is completely absorbed and the impact of a bank’s liquidity shock on the change in loan size is 
identified.  
24
 Estimation with a non-linear logit model results in a loss of over 40% of the sample, as firms drop 
out if they either undertook repurchases every year or never repurchased during the sample period. 
Thus, using this approach is fraught with a serious sample selection problem.   
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      The dependent variable Repurchase it is a dummy which equals one if firm i makes 
positive net repurchases in year t and zero otherwise. We use a dummy variable because the 
model only predicts that firms with lower agreement parameters are more likely to undertake 
repurchases; the model does not predict that, conditional on repurchasing, these firms will 
repurchase more.25 A comprehensive set of control variables are included, like “transitory” 
non-operating cash flows, market-to-book ratio and firm size, to account for those 
well-documented factors in explaining a firm’s repurchase decision. Our primary interest is in 
examining whether the estimated coefficients of the three main agreement parameters are 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. The hypothesis predicts that the 
coefficients of institutional shareholdings and the number of months that a firm’s EPS beats 
the forecast are negative and that of analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion is positive.  
 
4.1.2. Baseline Results 
      Table 2 presents the baseline results. The first through fifth columns report results 
using institutional shareholdings as a proxy for agreement. First, results obtained using the 
overall institutional shareholdings are presented in the first column. The coefficient of this 
proxy is negative and statistically significant. It suggests that a lower overall institutional 
ownership, which connotes lower investor agreement, is associated with a high likelihood of 
the firm undertaking a repurchase.  
      Then, we examine how the effect varies for institutional investors with different stakes 
in a firm. In the second and third columns, we use shareholdings by all institutions except the 
largest one (Top1) and by the largest institution (Top1) only as a proxy, respectively. The 
results indicate that firms buy back shares following a lower holding of those institutions with 
relatively smaller stakes.26 In additional tests, we repeat the analysis using the shareholdings 
by the blockholders (results not tabulated but available upon request). As in the case of the 
largest institutional investor’s shareholding, we do not find evidence that a firm’s repurchase 
decision is related with blockholders’ shareholdings. This suggests that, disagreement induces 
                                                        
25
 Skinner (2008) suggests that the overall level of repurchases is determined by earnings while other 
factors help explain the timing of repurchases. 
26
 In untabulated results, we also find that firms are more likely to undertake a repurchase following a 
decline in the aggregate holding of the second to the fifth largest institutional investors (Top2-5).   
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the largest institutional investor and blockholders to intervene in managerial decisions through 
private negotiations and other mechanisms, whereas it leads other institutional investors to sell 
their shares. 
      We conduct further robustness checks that strengthen the support for this hypothesis. 
By dividing institutions into the two categories – independent and grey – we expect to capture 
the notion that when independent institutional investors disagree with management, they are 
more likely to sell their shares, whereas grey institutions are less likely to sell shares because 
of potential or existing business ties with the firm. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 
present results using the holdings by independent institutions and by grey institutions as a 
proxy for agreement, respectively. The estimated coefficient of the holdings by independent 
institutions is significantly negative, while that of the holdings by grey institutions is 
significantly positive.27 The results support the idea that firms are more likely to repurchase 
shares in response to an expression of lower agreement by independent institutions. The 
positive association between the holdings of grey institutions and the repurchase decision, 
however, suggests that grey institutions absorb part of the shares sold by independent 
institutions.  
      Consistent with the literature, the estimated coefficients of other explanatory variables 
have the predicted signs and are statistically significant. The likelihood of an open-market 
repurchase increases in a firm’s “permanent” cash flows, “transitory” cash flows, firm size and 
the number of institutional investors, and decreases in a firm’s stock price, growth 
opportunities, capital expenditures and leverage. Also, the significantly positive coefficient of 
market return suggests that firms are more likely to repurchase during market upturns. 
Although a positive coefficient of the number of institutional investors is consistent with our 
agreement hypothesis, one might be concerned with a potential multicollinearity problem 
given the correlation between the number of institutional investors and institutional 
shareholdings. We thus conduct an additional test for multicollinearity and do not find that it is 
a significant concern.  
                                                        
27
 According to CDA/Spectrum, the classification of institution types in 1998 and beyond is not 
accurate due to a mapping error. Many banks, insurance companies, investment companies and 
independent investment advisors have been misclassified as type 5 (endowment and others) institutions. 
We repeat our analysis for the period 1987-1998 and find qualitatively similar results.  
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      The sixth and seventh columns of Table 2 provide regression results in which the other 
two main proxies for agreement are employed. Results in both columns support our agreement 
hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion (the sixth column) is 
positive and statistically significant, while that of the number of months that a firm’s EPS 
beats the forecast in a year (the seventh column) is significantly negative. We repeat the 
analysis with a different measure, the proportion of months with available analyst forecasts 
that the firm beats the forecast. The results (untabulated) remain unaltered. The estimated 
coefficients of other explanatory variables mimic those obtained previously when institutional 
shareholdings are used as an agreement proxy. 
      We verify the robustness of the above results by repeating the analysis employing the 
fourth proxy for agreement, dual-class control premium. Results are presented in the eighth 
column of Table 2. The estimated coefficient of dual-class control premium is 0.056 and 
statistically significant. It indicates that, when the premium of its voting shares over the 
non-voting shares increases as investors are more prone to disagree with managers, a 
dual-class firm is more likely to conduct open-market repurchases. The estimated coefficients 
of other control variables have signs consistent with those obtained using the three main 
proxies for agreement (except capital expenditure), except that they are not statistically 
significant for growth opportunities, leverage ratio and firm size, probably due to the small 
size of this subsample. 
      Overall, we find that firms buy back shares when they are faced with relatively low 
investor-management agreement. This finding holds for all the four agreement proxies we 
employ and is robust after controlling for other factors that are shown to affect a firm’s 
repurchase decision in the literature.        
 
4.1.3. Tests of Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
      Our agreement hypothesis centers on the idea that investors can disagree with 
managers even in absence of information asymmetry. Yet one may argue that some of our 
agreement proxies may be related to information asymmetry, which makes the interpretation 
of our results difficult. As discussed in Section 3.2, our firm fixed-effect estimation method 
helps to alleviate such a concern. To more convincingly distinguish our agreement hypothesis 
25 
 
from the information asymmetry hypothesis, we proceed to conduct further tests in the 
following two ways.  
      First, we include in the baseline regressions above three measures of information 
asymmetry that are unlikely to be confounded by any apparent link with our main agreement 
proxies. For each information asymmetry measure, we first regress the repurchase decision on 
the measure alone, and then we conduct a second regression which includes both that measure 
and our three main agreement proxies. The information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that 
the likelihood of repurchase decreases in Psi, and increases in Volatility and Earnings residual 
(std). In all regressions, we also include the control variables used in the baseline regressions 
as in Table 2, but to conserve space, we do not report them. For the agreement proxy involving 
institutional shareholdings, we only report the proxy using the holdings by all institutions 
except the Top1 institution. The results are presented in Table 3.       
      We find at best mixed evidence on the information asymmetry hypothesis. From Panel 
A of Table 3, consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, we find that the 
coefficients of Psi are negative, but they are not significant in the sample with dispersion data 
available. In Panel B and C, however, the coefficients of Volatility and Earnings residual (std) 
are both negative, which contradicts the information asymmetry hypothesis, although those of 
the latter measure are not significant.  
      Nevertheless, the results on all our main agreement proxies hold even after controlling 
for the information asymmetry measures. Furthermore, we find that the inclusion of our 
agreement proxies does not alter the economic or statistical significance of the three 
information asymmetry measures in a significant way, and vice versa. It confirms that the 
three measures are not related to investor-management agreement. 
      Second, we differentiate between our agreement theory and the alternative information 
asymmetry hypothesis by employing a proxy of agreement that also relates to the alternative 
interpretation, but with an opposite prediction: the number of months that a firm beats its EPS 
forecast in a year. The result, shown in the seventh column of Table 2, supports our agreement 
theory, invalidating the alternative information interpretation. 
       
4.1.4. Diversity of Opinion among Investors 
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      As discussed earlier, our idea of agreement is related to, but also differs from that of 
diversity of opinion among investors. To assure ourselves that our agreement proxies capture 
the difference of views between investors and management beyond the different opinions 
among investors, we employ an approach similar to Dittmar and Thakor (2007) and perform 
the following checks. First, one of our agreement proxies, the number of months that a firm 
beats its EPS forecast in a year, is clearly divorced from diversity of opinions among investors. 
The result of this “one-sided” test has been shown to support our agreement theory.  
      Then, we perform a second “one-sided” test by including Breadth of ownership in our 
baseline regressions. This variable captures the different opinions among investors but is not 
related to investor-management agreement. We are thus able to examine whether our main 
agreement proxies have any incremental explanatory power in a firm’s repurchase decision 
after accounting for diversity of opinion. The first six columns of Table 4 present the results of 
Breadth of ownership and the three main agreement proxies. Other control variables in the 
baseline regressions are included here, but not reported. The coefficients of Breadth of 
ownership are negative and statistically significant (except that they are marginally significant 
in the sample with dispersion data available), consistent with the stock overvaluation 
interpretation. Our previous results persist through all three agreement proxies, despite the 
inclusion of Breadth of ownership.  
      Some studies use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for diversity of opinion (see 
Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) for references). The results in Panel B of Table 3 seem 
to be rather consistent with this interpretation, in which the link of diversity of opinion (high 
volatility) with stock overvaluation predicts a lower likelihood of repurchase. In examining the 
effect of information asymmetry and diversity of opinion on acquirer abnormal returns, 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) find that the variable, Breadth of ownership, becomes 
insignificant after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. Thus, to address the concern that the 
diversity of opinion proxy we use, Breadth of ownership, may be noisy, we conduct a further 
robustness test by including both Breadth of ownership and Volatility in our baseline 
regressions. The results are presented in the last six columns of Table 4. The coefficients of 
both the two variables are significantly negative, and our results on the three agreement 
proxies are robust. This suggests that investor-management agreement and diversity of opinion 
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among investors both affect the repurchase decision.  
      Finally, our use of analysts’ forecast dispersion as an agreement proxy provides a 
“two-sided” test in discriminating between our agreement theory and diversity of opinion 
interpretation, because the latter offers the opposite prediction. The robust findings on 
dispersion in Table 2 through Table 4 strengthen the support for our agreement theory and 
contradict the diversity of opinion interpretation of dispersion.     
 
4.1.5. Executive Financial Incentives 
      Some studies on corporate payout policy relates the surge in repurchases in the 1990s 
to the growing use of stock options to compensate managements and employees or to reduce 
dilution from employee stock option plans (e.g., Babenko (2009), Fenn and Liang (2001), 
Kahle (2002) and Weisbenner (2004)). In our study, we measure repurchases as net 
repurchases, netting out any associated stock reissuance used in employee stock ownership 
and executive stock option plans, and in payment to the acquired firm in a merger and in other 
corporate activities. Thus, our agreement explanation of repurchase is unlikely to be affected 
by the firm’s dilution reduction consideration. We focus on the impact of managers’ financial 
incentives and examine the robustness of our agreement explanation. 
      We measure managers’ financial incentives using the top five firm executives’ stock 
ownership and unexercised stock options that were vested and thus exercisable. We obtain the 
data from ExecuComp and thus focus on relatively large firms which results in a significant 
cut of our sample size. Table 5 reports the results of including the two variables regarding 
managers’ financial incentives as well as measures of information asymmetry and diversity of 
opinion in the baseline regressions. We find our main results hold for two of our main 
agreement proxies. The coefficients of the third proxy, number of months that a firm beats its 
EPS forecast in a year, are small in magnitude and not significant. It is possibly because large 
firms in this subsample typically have a history of smooth earnings, and thus there is not 
sufficient within-firm variation in this variable. Consistent with the literature, the coefficients 
of management stock ownership are significantly negative and those of stock options are 
significantly positive, suggesting that managers are more likely to buy back shares with lower 
management stock ownership and more unexercised exercisable stock options.   
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4.1.6. Alternative Interpretations and Robustness Tests 
      The results we present thus far support the investor-management agreement hypothesis. 
In this subsection, we further test this hypothesis against other alternative interpretations. The 
purpose is not to rule out these interpretations, but rather to document that 
investor-management agreement has incremental power to explain a firm’s open-market 
repurchase decision, relative to the other motivations. 
 
Financial Flexibility View 
      One influential view of why repurchases are preferred to dividends in a firm’s payout 
mix is the financial flexibility inherent in repurchases (e.g. Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000)). The evidence supporting this view is that 
firms with higher “temporary”, non-operating cash flows tend to choose repurchases, while 
those with higher “permanent” operating cash flows pay dividends. And repurchasing firms 
also have more volatile cash flows. Thus, the correlation between repurchase decisions and 
investor-management agreement may be driven by the possible correlation between cash flow 
volatility and investor-management agreement.   
      To address this issue, we perform two checks. First, we have controlled for operating 
cash flows and non-operating cash flows, and the estimated coefficients have the expected 
signs and are highly significant in different specifications. Second, we focus on firms with 
below-median non-operating cash flows or below-median volatility of cash flows, and 
reexamine the relationship between repurchases and agreement for this subset of firms. We 
find that the results are robust for these firms. The three main proxies for agreement are 
negatively and significantly related to a firm’s repurchase decisions for those firms with 
below-median non-operating cash flows. Qualitatively similar results hold for firms with 
below-median volatility of cash flows, except that the relationship is only marginally 
significant when we use analyst EPS forecast dispersion as a proxy for agreement. When we 
look at firms with below-median but above-25-percentile volatility of cash flows, the 
relationship between repurchase and analyst EPS forecast dispersion resumes its significance. 
Overall, the results indicate that, even under the circumstance that the benefit of financial 
29 
 
flexibility is less likely to be a factor in driving a firm’s repurchase decisions, the effect of 
investor-management agreement persists.  
 
Growth opportunity 
      Another potential concern is that the relationship between repurchase decisions and 
agreement may arise simply because firms with limited growth opportunities may choose to 
pay out cash that they do not need for investments by repurchasing stock. This argument is 
consistent with the survey evidence in Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) which 
suggests that managers make repurchase decisions after investment decisions. If this is so, 
then the documented relationship between investor-management agreement and repurchase 
may merely be a reflection of the firm’s limited investment opportunities.  
      This issue is partly dealt with by the fact that we have controlled for investment 
opportunities using market-to-book ratios. Yet, the imprecise measurement of the 
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities creates difficulty in interpreting 
the results. To tackle this measurement issue, we use the preceding three-year sales growth of 
a firm as an additional proxy for investment opportunities following Datta, Iskandar-Datta and 
Raman (2001), and proceed as follows.  
      First, we find that our regression results based on market-to-book ratios are robust 
when we replace market-to-book with this additional proxy for investment opportunities. 
Second, we split the sample into high and low growth opportunities groups based on the 
median preceding three-year sales growth. The correlation between repurchase decisions and 
agreement holds even for the group of firms with high growth opportunities. Third, we 
conduct a joint test of the growth opportunities interpretation and the financial flexibility 
interpretation by examining firms with above-median preceding three-year sales growth and 
below-median non-operating cash flows. Even within firms that are least likely to pay out cash 
through repurchases due to the high growth opportunities and limited financial flexibility, we 
find the impact of agreement on a firm’s repurchase decisions is robust for all the three main 
proxies of agreement. These results suggest that a repurchase is more than a conventional 
payout mechanism that firms with limited growth opportunities use to distribute cash to 
shareholders. Rather, it is also used strategically to improve the agreement between investors 
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and management.                   
 
4.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2: The post-repurchase investor-management agreement improves. 
   
      Our theory predicts that the post-repurchase improvement in agreement decreases in 
the pre-repurchase agreement level after controlling for the amount of money spent in the 
repurchase. Yet, a direct examination of this prediction encounters some empirical difficulties. 
First, although it is intuitive to use the agreement proxies to measure the pre-repurchase 
agreement level, using the same variables to proxy for the post-repurchase agreement is 
subject to some interpretation problem. To illustrate, take the example of the analysts’ forecast 
dispersion proxy. The theory predicts that disagreeing investors will tender their shares in an 
open market repurchase, and thus the investor-management agreement improves after the 
repurchase. And yet those similarly disagreeing analysts may continue their coverage of the 
firm anyway regardless of whether the firm conducts a repurchase. Therefore, although the 
analyst-management agreement closely mimics the investor-management agreement prior to a 
repurchase, it might not be the case afterwards. Additionally, there is also a potential concern 
involved in pursuing a direct test of the post-repurchase improvement in agreement by 
regressing the change in agreement level on the pre-repurchase agreement level. Namely, there 
might be a mechanical relation between the dependent “change in agreement” variables and 
their initial values, even though it is theoretically plausible that a negative relationship does 
exist (indeed, our theory predicts that).  
      Therefore, instead of conducting a direct test of Hypothesis 2 using our agreement 
proxies, we investigate, without loss of flavor, a prediction of this hypothesis. Specifically, we 
examine how investors’ reaction to managerial decisions changes after a firm undertakes a 
repurchase. Our theoretical argument predicts that, due to the enhanced agreement between 
investors and management after a repurchase, investors are more likely to endorse managerial 
decisions after a repurchase than before. The empirical difficulty in testing this prediction is 
that most management decisions are either not observable or are not readily identifiable. One 
corporate event that allows us to circumvent this difficulty is acquisitions made by 
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repurchasing firms. The public announcement of an acquisition is accompanied by details of 
the deal, so the price reaction to the announcement reflects the extent to which investors 
endorse management’s decision to acquire rather than a resolution of information 
asymmetry.28 Despite that, we follow Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) and control for 
information asymmetry to examine the robustness of our results. We expect firms that 
undertake repurchases to increase investor-management agreement will experience larger 
abnormal price reactions to acquisition announcements than otherwise-comparable firms that 
do not engage in pre-acquisition repurchases.      
      Specifically, we compare the abnormal returns to a firm’s acquisition announcements 
made in the year preceding and in the year following an actual repurchase.29 Following the 
literature (e.g., Moeller, et al. (2007) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2008)), we require the 
sample of acquisitions meet the following criteria: the deal value is at least $1 million and is at 
least 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization measured on the eleventh day prior to the 
acquisition announcement; the acquirer controls less than 50% of the target prior to the deal 
and a successful acquirer owns 100% of the target afterwards; and the deal status is classified 
as completed, unconditional or withdrawn in SDC. The deal characteristics that we control for 
include target ownership status, method of payment and deal size. We create two indicator 
variables, denoted by Public and Equity, where Public equals one if the target is a public 
company and Equity equals one if the acquisition is paid either fully or partially with stock. 
The variable Deal size is the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s market capitalization 
measured on the eleventh day prior to the acquisition announcement.  
      We examine the three-day (–2, 0) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), estimated using 
the CRSP equally weighted index and the market model. In cases in which a firm makes 
multiple acquisitions in a given year, we use the average CAR of all acquisitions in that year 
weighted by the deal values, and the deal characteristics variables including Public, Equity and 
Deal size are also deal-value-weighted. We focus on a subset of firm-years with acquisitions 
                                                        
28
 Dittmar and Thakor (2007) explain why acquisition announcement returns are likely to be unaffected 
by asymmetric information.  
29
 Note that here we use actual repurchase rather than repurchase program announcement because a 
significant number of firms do not acquire any shares subsequent to a program announcement (see, for 
instance, Stephens and Weisbach (1998)). 
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observed in both the preceding year and the subsequent year, and estimate the impact of 
repurchases based on the following baseline model:  
 
Change in CAR it-1 to t+1 = α + β1* Repurchase it + β2 * Change in Deal Characteristics it-1 to t+1  
                     + β3 * Controls + ηt + εit 
 
      where Change in CAR it-1 to t+1 is the CAR of the acquisition that firm i makes in year 
t+1 minus the CAR of the acquisition that the firm makes in year t-1. Repurchase it is a 
dummy that equals one if the firm repurchases shares in year t. In addition to the changes in 
deal characteristics variables, we also include control variables at the firm level and changes in 
them from year t-1 to year t+1, like free cash flow (defined as operation income before 
depreciation net of interest expense, tax and total dividend payment, denominated by book 
value of assets), stock returns, market returns, market-to-book ratio and the natural log of sales. 
Year dummies are included in each regression, and robust standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. 
      We present the results in Table 6. Overall, we find that investors value deals made after 
repurchases significantly higher than if no repurchases were made. There is some evidence 
that the change in CARs is negatively associated with the free cash flow that a firm has. Our 
results hold even after we control for the level and change of free cash flow, alleviating the 
concern that the higher investor valuation might be merely driven by the mitigation of agency 
problem after the repurchase which is implied by the reduction in free cash flow. The 
repurchase dummy variable is correlated with the change in stock returns, as improved 
investor-management agreement also implies a higher stock price following a repurchase. The 
literature (e.g. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995, 2000) and Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009)) has documented a positive long drift in stock returns for repurchasing firms. Yet, the 
repurchase dummy variable is statistically significant even after controlling for the change in 
stock returns. 
      To examine whether our main finding is affected by information asymmetry and 
diversity of opinion, we include in the baseline model the three information asymmetry 
measures – Psi, Volatility and Earnings residual (std) and the diversity of opinion measure – 
Breadth of ownership. Consistent with Moeller et al. (2007), we find that higher diversity of 
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opinion leads to lower bidder abnormal returns for acquisitions of public firms paid for with 
equity. Also, there is weak evidence that bidders with more asymmetric information are fared 
worse when acquiring public targets paid for with equity (except the Earnings residual (std) 
measure), although the coefficients are not statistically significant possibly due to the small 
sample size. Our main results are robust to these controls, indicating that investors overall 
value managerial decisions more after the repurchase than before.  
 
5. Effect of Repurchase Announcement on Information Asymmetry 
      As discussed in the introduction, the early literature considers 
information-asymmetry-induced signaling as an important motive for open-market 
repurchases. If so, we would expect that information asymmetry would decline following the 
announcement of a repurchase program, as the announcement conveys favorable information 
that was initially available only to managers. The empirical finding in Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) contradicts this argument. They do not find operational improvements following 
repurchase announcements in those firms. Lie (2005) finds that actual repurchases, and not 
announcements per se, portend future improvements in profitability, although the findings of 
Gong, Louis and Sun (2008) suggest that the documented post-repurchase improvement in 
performance may be an illusion created by pre-repurchase downward earnings management. 
In this section, we provide additional evidence to collaborate their findings.30 
      We examine changes in investors’ valuation of a firm’s cash flows.31 If the information 
asymmetry/signaling hypothesis holds, the abnormal earnings-announcement returns before 
the repurchase announcement should be higher than those after the repurchase announcement. 
The reason is that information asymmetry is supposed to be lower after the repurchase 
announcement, so the information content of any signal should be smaller. 
      We also investigate how earnings surprise changes around a repurchase announcement. 
Following the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) effect literature, we define earnings 
                                                        
30
 Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007) also provide a different perspective from the undervaluation 
argument and show that a repurchase may be a strategic reaction to other firms’ repurchase decisions in 
the industry. 
31
 The previous literature has shown that repurchase announcements are not followed by an increase in 
cash flows. 
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surprise as announced earnings that exceed (fall short of) a proxy for the market’s expectation 
of earnings (see Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) for a complete reference). If earnings surprise 
is an indicator of information asymmetry, the signaling hypothesis predicts a significantly 
positive surprise for earnings announced prior to the repurchase announcement and the 
surprise subdued after the repurchase announcement. Specifically, to capture how the market’s 
expectation of earnings evolves in response to a repurchase announcement, we compute 
analysts’ forecast based earnings surprise (SURP) using quarterly earnings minus the most 
recent mean consensus analysts’ forecast for that quarter, which is then normalized by the 
firm’s stock price at the end of the prior month.32  
     We obtain repurchase announcements data from SDC. We focus on open market 
repurchases that are not announced along with other repurchase modes like privately 
negotiated repurchases, tender-offer or Dutch-auction repurchases. Following the literature 
(e.g., Guay and Harford (2000)), if a firm has more than one announcement within any given 
year, we only consider the first one. The three-day (–1, +1) abnormal earnings-announcement 
return (CAR) for a given firm is calculated using the CRSP equally-weighted index return and 
the market model. Following Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004), we drop extreme observations 
involving excess returns above 25% and below –25%. 33  We examine the changes in 
earnings-announcement CAR and in SURP induced by the repurchase announcement for two 
windows: the quarter prior to and subsequent to the repurchase announcement, (–1 quarter, +1 
quarter); two quarters prior to and two quarters subsequent to the repurchase announcement, 
(–2 quarters, +2 quarters). For the latter window, the SURP and CAR are averaged over 
quarters. 
      For the overall sample, Table 7 shows that the earnings-announcement CARs are 
significantly negative for the quarter and two quarters preceding the repurchase announcement. 
However, investors respond positively for the subsequent quarter and two quarters following 
the repurchase announcement. This runs counter to the prediction of the information 
                                                        
32
 We thank Roger Loh for generously providing us the SURP data. Another commonly used earnings 
surprise calculation takes the earnings in the same quarterly horizon in the prior year as a proxy for the 
market’s expectation of the current quarterly earnings (see, for instance, Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2006)). We believe the SURP definition is more suitable in our context.  
33
 About 3% of the observations are dropped. Winsorizing the excess returns, instead of dropping the 
extreme observations, does not affect the results. 
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asymmetry/signaling hypothesis. Instead, the stronger market responses to earnings 
announcements after repurchase announcements seem to be consistent with our argument that 
investors expect an improvement in investor-management agreement triggered by share 
repurchases. If the announced programs are implemented, investors who are less prone to 
agree with management will tender their shares, concentrating ownership in the hands of 
investors who agree more with management, boosting the firms’ stock prices.  
      Table 7 also reports both the mean and median SURPs around the repurchase 
announcement. From the results on the overall sample, we find no support for the signaling 
hypothesis. The mean and median SURPs are not significantly different from zero, either 
before or after the repurchase announcement (except that the mean SURP for the first quarter 
after the announcement is negative and significant at the 10% level). 
      We also consider the following alternative explanation for the abnormal 
earnings-announcement returns around repurchase announcements that we find. Gong, Louis 
and Sun (2008) find that managers deflate earnings prior to open-market repurchase 
announcements in firms that actually repurchase shares shortly after the repurchase 
announcements, while there is no evidence of such downward earnings management for firms 
that announce repurchases but do not actually buy back shares. 34  Thus, the positive 
post-repurchase earnings-announcement CARs might be due to the fact that post-repurchase 
realized earnings exceed expectations (irrationally) formed on the basis of pre-repurchase 
deflated earnings. To test this, we partition the sample into two groups – firms with actual 
repurchases in the year of the repurchase announcement and firms that do not actually 
repurchase in the year of the repurchase announcement.35 And then we investigate the 
changes in abnormal earnings-announcement returns for each group. 
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 In a similar spirit, Brockman, Khurana and Martin (2008) find that managers often manipulate 
information flow by increasing the percentage and magnitude of bad news announcements during the 
one-month period prior to repurchase announcements. 
35
 Lie (2005) finds that actual repurchases are usually conducted soon (during the quarter or in the 
following quarter) after the repurchase announcement. To account for cases that a repurchase is 
announced at the end of the year for a given firm, we also form the groups based on whether there are 
actual repurchases in the year or in the year following the repurchase announcement and find the results 
are qualitatively unaffected. In addition, as a robustness check, we follow Gong, Louis and Sun (2008) 
and Lie (2005) and require a firm’s actual repurchases exceed 1% of the firm’s market value to be 
included into the group classified as having made actual repurchases. We find that the results are robust 
to this more stringent classification. 
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      Consistent with the finding of Gong, Louis and Sun (2008), the results, also reported in 
Table 7, show that the significantly negative earnings-announcement CARs for the two 
quarters prior to the repurchase announcement are observed only for firms with actual 
repurchases. And the significantly negative mean pre-repurchase-announcement SURPs for 
those firms are consistent with the earnings lower than the market’s expectation, although the 
median SURPs are zero. However, there is only weak evidence that the mean 
post-repurchase-announcement SURPs become less negative, while the medians remain 
insignificantly different from zero. Neither the mean nor the median SURPs for firms without 
subsequent actual repurchases are significantly different from zero, no matter before or after 
the repurchase announcement. Overall, the evidence from SURPs for either group of firms 
does not reconcile with the predictions of the signaling hypothesis.  
      Nevertheless, we find significantly positive earnings-announcement CARs subsequent 
to the repurchase announcement not only in firms with subsequent actual repurchases, but also 
in firms without, the magnitudes of which are not significantly different from each other. This 
is hard to explain solely on the basis of pre-repurchase downward earnings management 
explanation, because firms that do not actually repurchase are unlikely to deflate 
pre-repurchase earnings. Rather, the finding is more consistent with investors responding 
positively in anticipation of an improvement in agreement resulting from actual repurchases 
(despite no shares repurchased ex post).36 Therefore, it is possible that both the potential 
pre-repurchase downward earnings management and the expected improvement in agreement 
are working in concert to generate the significantly positive post-repurchase-announcement 
CARs. 
      In sum, the positive change in the abnormal earnings-announcement returns around the 
repurchase announcement is unlikely to be due to a decline in information asymmetry, as 
predicted by the signaling hypothesis. A direct examination of the earnings surprise does not 
lend support to the signaling hypothesis either. Further, while we do not rule out the possibility 
that higher firm valuation following the repurchase announcement is due to pre-repurchase 
                                                        
36
 There is no evidence that the market accurately predicts at the time of the repurchase announcement 
which firms will actually repurchase shares (Lie (2005)). Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2008) find no 
difference in repurchase announcement returns between firms that repurchase shares and firms that do 
not repurchase shares during the quarter or the quarter following the repurchase announcement.  
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downward earnings management in some firms, it is, at least partially, explained by an 
expected improvement in agreement following the repurchase announcement.   
                 
6. Conclusion 
      In this study, we present a new explanation for open-market share repurchases and 
provide supporting empirical evidence. We also provide a link between a firm’s open-market 
share repurchase decision and its investment decision. Investors may disagree with 
management about investment decisions, which will adversely affect the firm’s stock price. A 
repurchase causes a change in the investor base as investors less prone to agree with 
management tender their shares when the firm repurchases. Consequently, firm ownership 
becomes concentrated in the hands of investors more prone to agree with management, which 
enhances investor-management agreement. Our empirical evidence strongly supports this 
motive for open-market repurchases.   
      Consistent with the more recent literature (e.g. Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Lie 
(2005)), we also show that a firm’s repurchase decision is unlikely to be related to information 
asymmetry and signaling. We infer the impact of a repurchase announcement on information 
asymmetry from the change in abnormal earnings-announcement returns and change in 
earnings surprise around the repurchase announcement. There is little evidence that an 
announcement of an open-market repurchase diminishes information asymmetry.37 In our 
study of investor-management agreement, we control for information asymmetry and the 
results still hold.  
      In the previous literature (e.g. Allen and Gate (1999), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), and 
Van den Steen (2004)), the extent of agreement has been taken as exogenously given. Our 
findings show that firms may undertake actions to affect the level of manager-investor 
agreement. Future research could explore other implications of such proactive firm initiatives. 
 
 
                                                        
37
 Clearly, this argument does not extend to tender offer repurchases, where there is strong evidence of 
statistically significant abnormal announcement returns with great magnitudes. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of 6291 firms from 1987 to 2006 
(55035 firm-years).  
  Panel A presents summary statistics for repurchase characteristics. Frequency is the proportion of 
years that a firm has positive net repurchase in the sample period. Repurchase/Market cap, 
Repurchase/Book equity and Repurchase/Assets are the dollar amount of net repurchase if it is positive, 
divided by the prior year end market value of equity, book value of equity and total assets, respectively.  
  Panel B reports summary statistics for the four measures of investor-management agreement: 
institutional shareholdings, is defined as the natural log of one plus the percentage of institutional 
ownership in the firm’s total shares outstanding; analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion, the standard 
deviation of analysts’ EPS forecasts in the fiscal year-end divided by book equity; Number of months 
beating EPS forecast, the number of months that a firm’s EPS beats forecast in a year; and dual-class 
control premium, the median difference in monthly stock price between voting and non-voting shares 
in a firm-year divided by the price of non-voting shares.  
  Panel C reports firm-level accounting variables and stock returns of the sample.  
  Panel D provides information on the three information asymmetry measures: Psi, Idiosyncratic 
volatility (Volatility) and standard deviation of the three-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements over the past five years (Earnings residual (std)), the diversity of 
opinion proxy – change in ownership breadth (Breadth of ownership), as well as managerial ownership 
and executive options holding. Managerial ownership is defined as shares owned (excluding options) 
by the top five firm executives divided by the number of total shares outstanding. Managerial options 
is the total number of unexercised options held by the top five firm executives that were vested. 
 Mean Median Standard   N      
   Deviation  
Panel A: Net repurchase 
Frequency 0.229 0.167 0.250 6291 
Repurchase/Market cap 0.034 0.019 0.039 14571 
Repurchase/Assets 0.036 0.018 0.044 14571 
Repurchase/Book equity 0.073 0.038 0.089 14571 
 
Panel B: Measures of agreement 
Institutional shareholdings (%)     
     Overall 35.06 31.04 26.16 55035 
     Top1 7.48 6.57 5.58 55035 
     Top2-5 11.35 11.51 7.85 55035 
     Blockholder 17.47 14.50 11.44 35220 
     Independent 15.77 9.96 15.46 51704 
     Grey 7.09 4.66 7.25 51894 
Analyst forecast dispersion (×10
3
) 0.76 0.09 3.29 26313 
Number of months beating EPS forecast 5.74 5.00 4.89 34151 
44 
 
Dual-class control premium 0.050 0.005 0.422 893 
     
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Sales ($MM) 1391.73 137.62 7002.37 55035 
Operating income 0.09 0.12 0.18 55035 
Non-operating income 0.01 0.01 0.02 55035 
Capital expenditure 0.07 0.05 0.07 55035 
Market-to-book 3.04 1.93 3.78 55035 
Debt ratio 0.16 0.12 0.17 55035 
Stock returns 0.16 0.04 0.67 55035 
Market returns 0.13 0.13 0.16 55035 
     
Panel D: Other control variables 
 
Psi 2.00 1.86 1.39 52066 
Volatility 0.04 0.03 0.02 54748 
Earnings residual (std) 0.07 0.06 0.04 31914 
Breadth of ownership 0.0037 0.0008 0.0127 41761 
Managerial ownership 0.05 0.01 0.09 15080 
Managerial options (MM) 0.948 0.447 1.503 15080 
4
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Table 3 
The Effect of Agreement on the Repurchase Decision: Controls for 
Information Asymmetry 
 
This table presents results from firm fixed-effect regressions where the dependent variable equals 
one if the firm makes repurchase in year t and zero otherwise. Three main agreement parameters, 
indicated at the top of columns, are used as follows: shareholdings by all institutions except the 
Top1 institution where shareholding is defined as the natural log of one plus the percentage of 
those institutions’ ownership in the firm’s total shares outstanding, analysts’ EPS forecasts 
dispersion defined as the standard deviation of the firm’s analyst EPS forecasts as of the year-end 
prior to repurchase divided by the book value of equity, and the number of months that the firm’s 
actual EPS beats the analysts’ forecast in a year. Three measures of information asymmetry 
include Psi, Idiosyncratic volatility (Volatility) and standard deviation of the three-day (-1,+1) 
cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements over the past five years (Earnings 
residual (std)). Other control variables used in Table 2 are included but not reported here for the 
sake of brevity. All regressions include year dummy variables. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by firm and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Psi as information asymmetry measure 
 Agreement Proxies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Institutional (except 
Top1) Ownership 
Analysts’ EPS Forecast  
Dispersion 
Number 
of Months Beating EPS 
Forecast 
Agreementt-1            -0.021***  2.090**  -0.001*** 
  (0.001)  (0.034)  (0.008) 
Psi t-1 -0.006*** -0.004** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.145) (0.134) (0.084) (0.086) 
Constant 0.159*** 0.129*** 0.001 -0.003 0.084 0.087* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.985) (0.968) (0.109) (0.096) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 52066 52066 25406 25406 32611 32611 
N. of firms  6035 6035 3249 3249 4130 4130 
R-squared 0.045 0.049 0.069 0.070 0.065 0.066 
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Panel B: Idiosyncratic volatility as information asymmetry measure 
 Agreement Proxies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Institutional (except 
Top1) Ownership 
Analysts’ EPS Forecast  
Dispersion 
Number 
of Months Beating EPS 
Forecast 
Agreementt-1            -0.029***  2.577***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Volatility t-1 -1.172*** -1.041*** -2.861*** -2.927*** -2.579*** -2.574*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.190*** 0.168*** 0.115* 0.113* 0.192*** 0.194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 54748 54748 26274 26274 34057 34057 
N. of firms  6256 6256 3340 3340 4288 4288 
R-squared 0.046 0.049 0.070 0.071 0.067 0.068 
 
 
 
Panel C: Earnings residual (sd) as information asymmetry measure 
 Agreement Proxies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Institutional (except 
Top1) Ownership 
Analysts’ EPS Forecast  
Dispersion 
Number 
of Months Beating EPS 
Forecast 
Agreementt-1            -0.035***  2.175**  -0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
Earnings residual 
(std) t-1 -0.230 -0.217 -0.185 -0.190 -0.249 -0.248 
 (0.116) (0.136) (0.305) (0.292) (0.124) (0.124) 
Constant 0.039 0.008 -0.004 -0.008 0.032 0.037 
 (0.515) (0.901) (0.950) (0.909) (0.616) (0.555) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 31914 31914 25014 25014 28808 28808 
N. of firms  3964 3964 3159 3159 3590 3590 
R-squared 0.061 0.064 0.070 0.071 0.065 0.066 
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Table 6 
The Effect of Repurchase on Investors’ Valuation of M&A Decisions 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
CARs of acquisition announcements from the year preceding (t-1) to the year following a 
repurchase (t+1). Repurchase dummy equals one if the firm makes repurchase in year t and zero 
otherwise. Deal Size is the transaction value of an acquisition divided by the market capitalization 
of the bidder measured at the 11
th
 day prior to the acquisition announcement. Equity is a dummy 
that equals one if the acquisition is paid either fully or partially with stock and zero otherwise. 
Public is a dummy that equals one if the target is a public company and zero otherwise. 
Infoasy/dop represents either the information asymmetry measure or the diversity of opinion proxy, 
as indicated at the top of columns. Infoasy/dop×Equity represents (Infoasy/dopt+1–Infoasy/dopt-1) 
×(Equityt+1–Equityt-1). Infoasy/dop×Public represents (Infoasy/dopt+1–Infoasy/dopt-1)× 
(Publict+1–Publict-1). Equity×Public represents (Equityt+1–Equityt-1)×(Publict+1–Publict-1). 
Infoasy/dop×Equity×Public represents (Infoasy/dopt+1–Infoasy/dopt-1)×(Equityt+1–Equityt-1)× 
(Publict+1–Publict-1). Free cashflow is defined as operation income before depreciation net of 
interest expense, tax and total dividend payment, denominated by book value of assets. Other 
variables are as defined earlier. All regressions include year dummy variables. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by firm and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)       (4) (5) (6) 
   Psi Volatility 
Earnings 
residual 
(std) 
Breadth of 
ownership 
Repurchase dummyt 0.013** 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 0.010* 0.011* 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.050) (0.047) (0.086) (0.081) 
Deal Sizet+1 – Deal Sizet-1  0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
Equityt+1 – Equityt-1  -0.014*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.104) (0.147) (0.168) (0.200) 
Publict+1 – Publict-1   -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.022*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Infoasy/dopt+1 – 
Infoasy/dopt-1   -0.002 0.080 0.333** 0.000 
   (0.289) (0.792) (0.020) (0.998) 
Infoasy/dop×Equity   0.001 0.313 -0.513** -0.086 
   (0.693) (0.452) (0.026) (0.423) 
Infoasy/dop×Public   0.003 0.698 -0.138 0.018 
   (0.361) (0.309) (0.676) (0.897) 
Equity×Public   0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 
   (0.891) (0.798) (0.630) (0.886) 
Infoasy/dop×Equity×Public   -0.006 -1.252 0.474 -0.575*** 
   (0.307) (0.214) (0.355) (0.006) 
Infoasy/dopt   -0.001 0.153 0.027 0.007 
   (0.532) (0.626) (0.790) (0.930) 
Free cashflowt+1 – Free 
cashflowt-1 -0.067 -0.060 -0.059 -0.059 -0.125** -0.144*** 
 (0.369) (0.421) (0.433) (0.435) (0.032) (0.009) 
Stock returnt+1 – Stock 
returnt-1 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 (0.459) (0.712) (0.733) (0.704) (0.365) (0.510) 
Market returnt+1 – Market 
returnt-1 -0.011 -0.013 -0.004 -0.010 0.027 0.007 
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 (0.763) (0.727) (0.913) (0.778) (0.464) (0.842) 
Market-to-bookt+1 – 
Market-to-bookt-1 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.003* 0.001 
 (0.226) (0.091) (0.090) (0.102) (0.088) (0.303) 
Sales(log)t+1 – Sales(log)t-1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.775) (0.907) (0.850) (0.945) (0.993) (0.605) 
Free cashflowt -0.150* -0.152* -0.154* -0.143 -0.022 -0.023 
 (0.098) (0.091) (0.097) (0.108) (0.676) (0.599) 
Stock returnt -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.681) (0.875) (0.848) (0.994) (0.480) (0.671) 
Market returnt 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.026 -0.026 0.025 
 (0.547) (0.610) (0.593) (0.548) (0.543) (0.557) 
Market-to-bookt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.968) (0.951) (0.759) (0.909) (0.774) (0.736) 
Sales (log)t 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.730) (0.751) (0.896) (0.487) (0.402) (0.220) 
Constant -0.019 -0.021 -0.014 -0.026 -0.063* -0.040* 
 (0.455) (0.415) (0.643) (0.412) (0.081) (0.075) 
Observations. 1462 1462 1453 1462 1194 1246 
R-squared 0.043 0.062 0.081 0.083 0.094 0.084 
5
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